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support of it. France has even endured significant unemployment and social unrest due to its policy decisions
aimed at being able to meet the convergence criteria. France and Germany have also shown cooperation in
forming the union.
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Europe Will Form a Monetary Union . . . Eventually 
Tina Beaird 
The issue has been discussed almost to 
exhaustion: Will the European Community 
(EC) ever achieve monetary union? To 
address this issue we need to look at the 
political and economic reasons for integration 
as well as the many obstacles that the countries 
must face as they aim for monetary union. It 
is my opinion that monetary union in the EC 
will be achieved. However, I am not sure 
whether or not it will actually take place by 1 1999, the date set in the Maastricht Treaty. 
This treaty lays th guidelines the countries are 
to follow in order to join the union. It is also 
not possible to tell how many of the current 
EC member countries will join the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) when it does form 
because it is likely that many will not be close 
enough to meeting the requirements. There 
are many reasons why the countries should 
integrate and there have been many steps taken 
towards the unification. But the countries are 
not without their fears and fictions, and to this 
day full monetary union seems distant. 
By integrating, it is hoped the countries 
will have political, economic, and social 
progress without restrictions on the movement 
of goods, services, capital, and people. The 
countries are expected to be strengthened by 
unity. Fair and effective competition will raise 
the standard of living. As a monetary union, 
there will be less uncertainty of exchange 
rates, thus trade and investment in the 
countries should increase as business there will 
be easier and less costly. The societies will 
also save in the way of transaction costs, 
information costs (incurred when one has to 
develop a sense of what a reasonable price for 
an item is in another currency), and social 4 cohesion costs. This final cost will be eliminated by the fact that with a single 
currency countries may lose some of their 
national identity or unity. By doing so their 
purchasing decisions will not be based on their 
desire to see only their country's economy 
succeed, but rather the decisions will be made 
based on the benefit of the union as a whole. 
A single currency will make it easier to 
manage common EC institutions as well as 
create a more stable internal price level for the 
union. In addition, the countries will have a 
single inflation rate which is expected to be 
relatively low. 
While these advantages of forming the 
EMS exist, the transition towards unionization 
has not been without its troubles and doubts. 
On a political level, the countries fear giving 
up much of their power to supranational 
governing institutions. These institutions act 
independently of the national governments so 
that decisions made will be implemented by all 
the member nations without their individual 
say in the matter. But, in laying out the 
groundwork for these institutions, it seems the 
countries d y  do not have much to fear. The 
actions the European Council can take when a 
country's economic situation may be 
jeopardizing the operation of the monetary 
union are weak. The Council is expected to 
make recommendations to the country, but 
does not have any certain strict rules to make 
the country follow. Another example of the 
weak response of the Council is when a 
country runs a high budget deficit. There are 
numerous steps that could take years to follow 
through with before any fine is actually 
demanded of the country. I think that the 
weak actions the supranational institutions can 
take against individual countries should not be 
too much of a wony for the individual 
countries and I do not see this as a hindrance 
towards union. 
There are also many real economic fears. 
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As a monetary union the countries will not 
have the abiity to make independent monetary 
policies to boost their economies. They also 
will have very Iittle fiscal policy fieedom. 
These policy decisions will be left up to the 
Central Bank and other governing institutions 
of the EMS. Countries fear that the decisions 
made by these institutions may not always be 
beneficial to them and may hurt their economy. 
Britain due to their high unemployment rates. 
While the monetary authorities widened the 
exchange rate bands so that speculators would 
not be able to have a significant impact on the 
currencies, the countries were still suffering 
very high unemployment. Britain gave up and 
dropped out of the EMS. This has definitely 
added to the fiction of monetary integration 
because it shows the little faith or will some 
They fear that the decisions may be made by countries have in forming the monetary union. 
the dominant country at the time, and in that 
country's best interests, instead of for the 
benefit of the union as a whole. "Many countries are forced to 1 
Currently, the countries fear a "German 
Europe." They fear that because of 
Germany's strength and influence in Europe 
right now, the political and economic decisions 
would be made in Germany's interest and at 
the expense of the other countries. This might 
mean that other countries would continue to 
suffer with recessions and unemployment 
while Germany suffers little economic 
troubles. This fear is strengthened by the past 
actions of Germany such as when it raised its 
interest rates in the early 1990s because of its 
increased spending in East Germany. Since 
Germany was the anchor of the fixed exchange 
rate system at the time, the other countries 
were forced to increase their interest rates as 
well, leading to deeper recessions for them and 
also making their goods less competitive. 
There have atso been other frictions on the 
path to monetary integration. The Italian and 
Spanish crises in 1992 caused these two 
countries' currencies to lose their 
competitiveness. Since their price levels 
diverged so much fiom Germany's, 
speculators bet a . the countries' ability to 
keep their currencies at their current values 
and forced devaluations that were much 
greater than they would have needed to be to 
remain in the fixed exchange rate system. 
With a common currency, though, the value of 
the currency would be the same in all the 
countries, hence a crisis like this would not 
occur. Another crisis occurred in France and 
make economic choices that 
are causing severe unrest and 
unemployment." 
The Maastricht Treaty also creates 
frictions in countries because of its stated 
convergence criteria that countries must meet 
in order to join the EMU. The "policy 
paradox" it presents forces countries to suffer 
at the expense of trying to meet the 
convergence criteria. The countries do not , 
have monetary policy powers and are 
constrained in their use of fiscal policies. They I 
cannot implement fiscal policies to stimulate 
their economy in order to get output and 
unemployment levels where they want them 
because in order to meet the criteria their debt 
and deficit must not be more than 60% and 3% 
of their GDP, respectively. The Treaty also 
sets criteria regarding the inflation rate and the 
long-term interest rate of a country. Also, a 
country cannot have devalued its currency in 
the two years prior to joining the EMU. This 
means that many countries are forced to make 
economic choices that are causing severe 
unrest and unemployment for their citizens. 
Whether the convergence criteria will 
actually be met by many of the countries by the 
date required (January 1, 1999) is 
questionable. Currently the deficit to GDP 
ratio requirement is only met by Luxembourg, 
although Germany and the Netherlands are 
close to meeting it. Greece and Italy, on the 
other hand, are far fiom the requirements. The 
debt to GDP ratio is currently met by France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, ~ritain, &d Spain. 
Portugal and Denmark are not far fiom 
reaching the goal. Others are quite far fiom 
the criteria. There is still time for more 
countries to converge in more of the criteria 
areas. As the date approaches I think more 
and more of them will come closer to meeting 
the criteria. 
Germany remains strong in its stance that 
it will not allow members to enter the union 
without meeting the criteria. However, I 
believe that when the time comes, Germany 
will decide to be more loose on its demands. 
Right now Germany must remain tough. If it 
didn't, then the other countries would have no 
reason to continue trying to meet the criteria. 
It is true that the closer the countries are to the 
convergence criteria the better the union 
' t 
would finction and the more effective the 
implementation of various policies would be 
for the overall welfare of the union. 
"The criteria are intended to guarantee the 
convergence of inflation rates and the 
imposition of a measure of fiscal rectitude 
prior to monetary unification. As such, they 
are not prerequisites for currency union, only 
of a currency union that works in the way 
those who specified the conditions hope it 
will" (Copeland, 1994). So, if all the countries 
do not meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria then it does not necessarily mean that 
the EMS will not be able to be successful. It 
merely means that right now the criteria are 
considered to be the characteristics that will 
make the union work best. I think the 
countries should try to be as close to the 
requirements as possible. However, there 
must be some leniency allowed in deciding 
acceptance to the EMS. Otherwise, it may 
never form. It is also possible that it could 
allow 'associate membershid for non- 
-m 
,.+ qualifiers. These members would have more 
lax criteria but the benefits and aid would 
probably also be less than if they were full 
members. This would not be as sound an 
economic decision but would be less risky than 
if they were full members ("EMU," 1996). 
While I have just shown many problems 
along the EC's path to integration, I still feel 
positively about the formation of monetary 
union. Germany has continued to remain 
strong in its backing of the union and its 
support of it. France has even endured 
significant unemployment and social unrest 
due to its policy decisions aimed at being able 
to meet the convergence criteria. France and 
Germany have also shown cooperation in 
forming the union. 
Other positive steps for monetary union 
are the Schenegen Agreements reached 
between France, Germany, and the Benelux 
countries. Due to the implementation of these 
agreements in 1995, there are presently no 
border checks between these countries. There 
exists much more cooperation between the 
countries and an overall increased ease of 
dealings between them Countries that are not 
a part of this group still face the same 
treatment as they always have. "And let this 
be food for thought in some capitals, London 
and elsewhere, as Schenegen is proving that 
one cannot prevent one group of countries 
fiom moving fonmrd, if they really wish to do 
so" (Reuter, 1995). This shows the 
seriousness of these countries in working 
together and forming a union. It is a definite 
step in the right direction. 
It is also a good sign to know that plans 
are in the works for the new currency to be 
used in the union. The currency has a name, 
the ewo, and designs of it are being drafted. 
Work is being put into managing the transition 
and looking into the costs of rewriting 
computer programs ("Vial," 1995). These 
too, are signs that Europe is on its way to 
monetary union. 
Another important issue that has arisen 
recently is the two-tier approach to monetary 
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union. In this approach some countries, the 
stronger ones, would form the first tier and 
would operate with a single currency. The 
second-tier countries would not be so tightly 
held to the first tier's currency but would also 
be a union of sorts. This can be seen as 
positive because the first-tier countries are the 
ones with the most similarities in economic 
cycles and fiscal policy positions. It is 
important that the countries be similar in these 
ways so that monetary and fiscal policies are 
beneficial for more than one country. These 
countries also tend to be closer to meeting the 
convergence criteria. When the second-tier 
countries come closer to meeting the 
requirements then they too could join the core 
group. This arrangement would allow some of 
the EU countries to move forward and benefit 
from unionization. Their strength ~uld then 
make it easier for other countries to join later. 
I feel that the benefits outweigh the costs 
in the fonnation ofmonetary union in the EU. 
I also think that the majority ofEU countries 
believe the same. It is difficult, however, for 
them to make the necessary sacrifices in their 
countries to meet the criteria. Not every 
country is as economically healthy as 
Gennany. I expect that the stronger countries 
(Germany, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Austria) 
will be able to, and will find it in their best 
interests, to fonn a monetaJy union possibly by 
1999. Once these countries take the big step 
forward I expect that the other countries will 
not want to be left behind and will also find it 
in their best interest to strengthen their 
economies so they too can join. With a 
powerful Germany leading the way, I feel that 
monetary union will occur. 
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